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Abstract
This paper estimates the role of country/variety comparative advantage in the
decision to offshore assembly of more than 2000 models of 197 car brands headquartered
in 23 countries. While offshoring in the car industry has risen from 2000 to 2016, the
top five offshoring brands account for half the car assembly relocated to low-wage
countries. We show that the decision to offshore a particular car model depends on
two types of cost (dis)advantage of the home country relative to foreign locations.
The first type, the assembly costs common to all models, is estimated via a structural
triadic gravity equation. The second effect, model-level comparative advantage, is an
interaction between proxies for the model’s skill and capital intensity and headquarter
country’s abundance in these factors.
1 Introduction
Concern over the effects of offshoring on workers motivates a large body of empirical research.
A prominent example is Pierce and Schott (2016), who attribute a large part of the decline in
US manufacturing employment to the reallocation of production to China by US firms. They
point out that the biggest increase in Chinese exports to the US following WTO accession
was for foreign affiliates. Furthermore, WTO accession boosted the number of related-party
import transaction in US imports.
∗An earlier version of this paper was prepared within the “Value Added in Motion (VAM)” project
funded by the Enel Foundation. We thank participants in LSE, Milan, National Bank of Belgium and UBC
workshops for their comments and wish to specifically acknowledge helpful suggestions from Giorgio Barba
Navaretti, Kerem Cos¸ar, Peter Morrow, Peter Neary, and Gianmarco Ottaviano. This paper was written
partly while Keith Head was a visitor at the Centre for Economic Performance at LSE. This research has
received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the Grant Agreement No. 313522.
†Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia and CEPR, keith.head@sauder.ubc.ca
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Which products are most vulnerable to the offshoring threat? While Blinder (2006) con-
tends that “virtually all [manufacturing] jobs were potentially moveable offshore’,” Hanson
(2015) finds that in reality even within manufacturing, offshoring is confined to a handful of
sectors. In this paper we zoom in on one of those sectors, the car industry, to examine the
country and variety-level characteristics that make offshoring more likely. One unsurprising
factor promoting offshoring is sectoral cost competitiveness of the potential offshoring coun-
try. A second key factor is variety-level misfit between product factor intensities and country
factor abundances. We investigate these hypotheses, exploiting exceptionally detailed data
from the car industry.
Car makers have a long history of assembly in foreign countries: Ford of Canada began
manufacturing operations in 1904. For the most part, the car industry, like other industries,
has moved production abroad to obtain better access to foreign customers.1 Recently, there
has been a rise in use of foreign assembly to serve markets other than just the host country. In
2010, with unions complaining that Renault had moved three quarters of its car production
outside of France, then president Sarkozy summoned Renault’s CEO, Carlos Ghosn, to
the Elyse´e Palace “to explain the carmaker’s strategy.” He was reportedly told to retain
production of the Clio for the French market in France, rather than move it to the Renault
plant in Turkey. Six years later 64 percent of the new generation Clios sold in France were
produced in Turkey with the remainder in France. In March 2014 Porsche announced that
it would move production of the Cayenne SUV from Germany to Slovakia. This would mark
the first time that Porsches would be assembled outside of Germany.
Stories such as these suggest a major change in the pattern of auto assembly is under
way. To what extent will auto production go the way of clothing and consumer electronics
and migrate to less developed countries? This paper quantitatively investigates the state
of offshoring in the passenger car industry. We propose two ways to measure the amount
of offshoring of assembly and show that it is not growing as much as the anecdotes above
suggest. Furthermore, offshoring for the home market is highly heterogeneous: the top five
offshoring brands account for half of the cars made abroad and sold in the brands’ home
market.
To explain the large observed variation in offshoring, we examine the country- and model-
level determinants of the decision to assemble a particular model in a lower wage country.
Our aim is to understand why offshoring takes place and in particular which firms find it
attractive. The results we obtain support a comparative advantage model of offshoring.
Firms based in countries that have relatively high assembly costs are more likely to offshore
1Irarrazabal et al. (2013) report that 62% of the goods made by US affiliates are sold in the domestic
market.
2
in general and the most likely models to be offshored are the less expensive cars of brands
based in high income countries. We interpret price as a proxy for the skill and capital
intensity of the model and per capita income as a proxy for abundance in the corresponding
factors of production.
Why is offshoring in the car industry of particular interest? First of all, the car industry
is large and considered important by government policy makers. Passenger cars are the
largest expenditure category among goods.2 Industry associations in the European Union
(EU) and United States (US) report very large employment shares for the broadly defined
automotive sector. Including parts and other related activities, it accounts for 5.8% of
the total employed population of the EU and nearly 5% of US employment. Car makers
were deemed sufficiently important to receive $US 81 bn under both the Bush and Obama
administrations. In January 2017, Donald Trump threatened General Motors with border
taxes if it continued to make Chevrolet Cruzes intended for the US market in Mexico.
A second compelling reason to study offshoring in the car industry is the existence of ex-
traordinarily rich data. IHS Markit, an automotive consultancy, provides a nearly exhaustive
account where cars are made and then sold. Comparable data do not appear to be available
on a worldwide basis for any other sector of the economy. Most government-provided data
sets are restricted to parent firms or affiliates based in a single reporting country. IHS tracks
the factory where over 2000 models are assembled by nearly all manufacturers and brands.
The data, running from 2000 to 2016, shows annual flows at the level of individual models
identifying location of assembly and country of sale (the data are based in part on new car
registrations). Because we can map the origins of each brand back to a headquarters country
(which we designate as the brand’s “home”), we capture the three essential locations that
form part of our criteria for offshoring: where each brand makes the cars it sells in its brand
home and other markets. Some important dimensions of the data include the following:
• 2444 local nameplates for 2026 “global nameplates” (models) identified by the makers.
• For each model we also know the start and end year of each “program” (version of the
model).
• The data also distinguishes the size and function of the model.
• For about 1000 models and 28 countries (contained in a second module offered by IHS
Markit), we have destination-specific sales price information.
• 197 brands from 23 different brand homes.
2They account for 4% of personal consumption expenditures in the United States.
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• 76 different markets (countries that record brand/origin).
• 52 different assembly countries (almost all world production).
Using the auto data set, we conduct three main empirical exercises. The first step
quantifies the magnitude and direction of offshoring to this date. By offshoring we mean
the relocation of production intended for a given market to new assembly sites. Our narrow
definition of offshoring focuses on the home market of the brand. The narrow definition of
offshoring thus removes all relocation of production to get closer to foreign customers.3 Our
broad definition considers all assembly outside the brand’s home country to be offshoring. In
both cases, we define the home country to be the place where the headquarters of the brand
is located. In cases such as Volvo where headquarters functions are mixed between countries
(Sweden and China), the home country is defined based on where the brand was founded
(Sweden). By direction, we distinguish “downward” offshoring to lower income countries
from “flat” and “upward” offshoring to other countiries at similar or higher income levels.
Our threshold for flat is for the producing country per-capita income to be no more that
20% above or below the per capita income of the brand home.
After establishing that offshoring to serve the home market remains small and is mainly
carried out by a small number of brands, we investigate the determinants of the decision
to offshore all or part of the production of a car model. We hypothesize that a key input
in that decision would be a general cost advantage of the home country in car assembly.
To obtain the country-specific “assembly advantage” term, we first estimate a specification
of multinational production flows derived from Arkolakis et al. (2018). This specification
has origin-year and brand-destination-year fixed effects as well as indicators for bilateral
frictions. In the model, the origin-year fixed effects are proportional to the ratio of worker
productivity to their wages.
Our final exercise is to estimate a fractional logit on the percent of production that is off-
shored at the model level. One previous study has also sought to identify the characteristics
of products that vehicles that makes them more susceptible to offshoring: McCalman and
Spearot (2013) examined the Post-NAFTA expansion of capacity to produce light trucks in
Mexico. They found that US firms “offshored varieties that were older and less complex
to produce.” We will compare our worldwide car results to their North American trucking
results.
The remainder of the paper consists in 5 sections. Section 2 documents the changes that
occurred in worldwide production of cars over the 2000–2016 period. Section 3 then specifies
3This motive for production abroad is also referred to as “tariff-jumping” though tariffs are often not the
main trade cost.
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our definitions of offshoring, and quantifies its extent and patterns over time and space. Our
modeling of the offshoring decision and estimating equation are described in section 4. The
measurement of the different covariates involved in the offshoring regression is contained in
section 5, and section 6 provides our estimates of the decision to produce their models in a
country where costs are lower than at home.
2 Emerging economies in the auto assembly sector
In this section we chart the changes in the location of passenger car production that have
occurred from 2000 to 2016. We look at three specific cases of “emerging market” economies
that assemble growing shares of the world’s cars.
We begin by noting that total car production in the OECD in 2016 is 41.78 million units,
only 9% higher than in 2000. It increased somewhat in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis, then fell
sharply, before stabilizing at the old level in 2013 and has been growing slowly since then.
On the other hand, non-OECD production has risen every year since 2000, cumulating a
more than six-fold increase from 2000 to 2016.
Figures 1 and 2 zoom in on the changing nature of production in three economic areas
that have experienced impressive growth in their shares of world production: China, Eastern
Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria),
and Mexico.
The case of China, shown in Figure 1 is the most straightforward to describe. There,
production growth has matched demand growth almost exactly one for one until purchases
outstripped production in 2010 and China became a small net importer. Foreign brands
have gradually moved ahead of Chinese brands. Initially China had a very large number of
very small brands. In 2000 its share or world brands was 9.2 times higher than its share
of world production. Over the following 16 years the Chinese brands expanded production
on the intensive margin. By 2016 the brand to production share ratio fell to 1.4. Chinese
brands remain on the small side and based on the experience of the traditional producers,
we may expect a “shake-out” to occur in the future.
China may one day replicate in car assembly its success in areas like electronics assembly
where it is already the “workshop of the world.” However there is no sign of this in the data
yet. One limitation China faces is that it has few free trade agreements with major markets.
Our regression analysis in section 5.1 finds that trade agreements and tariff rates have large
effects.
Contrasting with the Chinese case, Figure 2 shows that Eastern Europe and Mexico have
experienced sluggish growth in domestic demand, while hosting a share of world production
5
Figure 1: The Growth of China
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Figure 2: The Growth of the Periphery
(a) Central & Eastern Europe (CEEC) (b) Mexico
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that grows steadily over time starting in 2004. In both cases, net exports grow substantially
over the period as a result. This pattern is particularly pronounced for Eastern European
countries who joined the European Union. Since 2004 exports of foreign brands (mainly
from Western Europe) have boomed.
Two cases provide a good illustration of the migration of assembly to Eastern and Central
Europe. Starting in the 1970s, an assembly factory in Tychy assembled a Polish version of the
Fiat 126. Fiat purchased the plant in 1992 when it was privatized. Recently, Fiat allocated
to the Tychy factory the new and highly successful 500 model. Tychy assembled almost as
many cars as Fiat’s five biggest plants in Italy with one third the workers each earning one
third the pay.4 Tychy operates 24 hour per day, six days per week, whereas Fiat’s Italian
plants operated at 40% capacity utilization in 2012.
Renault’s Revoz plant in Novo Mesto, Slovenia provides a somewhat similar story. It
began as a joint venture in the 1980s. The plan was to focus on selling cheap Renaults in the
Yugoslav market. That plan had to be altered when Yugoslavia fell apart. Slovenia emerged
instead as an offshoring and exporting platform.
Mexico (which has no local brand), also benefits from a regional trade agreement. NAFTA
was signed in 1993, but its tariff reductions were phased in over the next decade. We
unfortunately lack data before 2000 so we miss most of the period where the NAFTA tariff
cuts were being phased in. The reasons behind the 2004 turnaround and subsequent boom
in Mexico’s net exports shown in Figure 2(b) are unclear.
The picture that emerges from figure 2 is one of two major historical production bases
(North America and Western Europe) offshoring part of their car assembly to their respective
low-cost “peripheries” (Mexico for the US brands and Eastern Europe for the European
brands). We now try to quantify the offshoring movement in a more global and systematic
way.
3 Measuring offshoring
The data set we have allows us to track the production of individual products. We can dis-
tinguish horizontal (market-seeking) activities from offshoring because we know the location
of assembly and also where the cars are sold for each model. Another great advantage of our
data is to be able to follow a specific variety over time, and therefore keep track of changes
in the location of production with potential transfer to low cost countries.
To measure offshoring we must first define it. Feenstra (2004) defines offshoring as the
“transfer of production overseas, whether it is done within or outside the firm.” We focus on
4Facts taken from Rattner article in Financial Times, October 4, 2012.
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single task or activity, the assembly of passenger cars. Our data has no information on the
sources of components so this will not be a paper about “slicing the value chain” except in
the sense of separating final assembly from design and distribution. The question begged by
Feenstra’s definition is when should we consider overseas production to be transferred? It
seems like the essential condition should be that but for this increase in offshore production,
there would have been no corresponding reduction in home-country production.
We work with two definitions of offshoring. Our first definition is that a car is considered
offshored if it is consumed in the home country but assembled in a different country. This
approach excludes offshore production that is aimed at serving the host country’s market,
with the general presumption that much or all of those sales would not be served by the
brand if it did not produce locally. Such production therefore has small or no impact on
domestic workers. This version of offshoring focuses on the home country, which is the only
market firms are guaranteed to be able to serve without facing tariff or non-tariff barriers.
“Narrow” offshoring refers to cars assembled overseas but sold in the home market.5 This
seems to correspond to what political leaders have in mind when talking about offshoring.
We reproduce a quote by French president’s Chief of Staff, made public at a time when the
French government was negotiating with Renault’s CEO Carlos Ghosn about the potential
re-location of a new model’s (Clio 4) assembly in Turkey:
“Ghosn said very clearly that the Clio 4s corresponding to the French market will
be made in France... You can’t ask Renault to make cars for Turkey in France,
which would mean not selling any more cars in Turkey.” (Claude Gue´ant, Sarkozy
Chief of Staff, January, 18, 2010)
The narrow definition of offshoring is the appropriate one if most overseas production for
foreign markets would have to be produced in those markets. Thus it would not substitute
for domestic employment.
An alternative definition, takes a quite opposite view, emphasizing substitution between
domestic and foreign employment, regardless of the final market. From a worker perspective,
Renault Clios made in Turkey are Clios not made in France—no matter who ultimately buys
them. Consequently, our “broad” definition of offshoring is production outside the brand
home divided by the brands production in all locations.6 The right definition depends on the
cross-substitution possibilities, which are difficult to assess ex ante. Therefore, our approach
is to “bracket” the actual extent of offshoring with these two admittedly extreme definitions.
5Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013) refer to this as “pure vertical MP” (multinational production) but
the “vertical” terminology would be confusing in this context since we only consider one stage of production
(assembly). Also offshoring has become the standard term in policy discussions.
6This includes vertical, horizontal and export platform MP. We thank Peter Neary for suggesting us that
we should consider export platform production in our definitions of offshoring.
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Narrow offshoring selects a home where the brand was historically produced and divides
imports by total consumption. Broad offshoring looks at the total production outside of
the brand home base. This “brand home” country is therefore an essential concept in our
definitions of offshoring. We choose to define “home” as the country where the brand is
headquartered or where it was founded.
Table 1: The Twingo example
Market: FRA COL URY VEN ECU
Plant: Flins Novo Mesto Medellin Novo Mesto Montevideo Medellin Medellin
Version: I II III I II I I I
2000 76622 1749 578
2001 78891 1927 476
2002 67588 3508
2003 53146 4503
2004 47699 5168
2005 45594 7456
2006 38133 9937 2666 53
2007 8525 43618 10069 3377 34
2008 65333 6660 960
2009 107456 7756 137 25
2010 92183 5565
2011 68236 6780 23
2012 39697 3273
2013 39032 277
2014 15824 26195 134
2015 45425 2
2016 40796
Note: The figures reported are total sales. Over the whole period, this model is sold by Renault in 46
different markets and produced in 4 different plants: Flins in France, Novo Mesto in Slovenia, Medellin in
Colombia, and Montevideo in Uruguay (which stopped production in 2002). All other countries where that
car is continuously sold (Germany, Italy, etc.) exhibit the same sourcing pattern as for cars sold in France.
The case of the Renault Twingo illustrates some of the important issues involved in defin-
ing offshoring. Table 1 displays sales of that model in the HQ country and in the only 4
markets that are served by one of the Latin American plants. For almost all markets, this
model was sourced entirely from the Flins factory near Paris until 2007. The exceptions were
assembly in Colombia and Uruguay for local sales (“horizontal MP” in the taxonomy of Ra-
mondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013)). In 2007, with the launch of a new version (II), Twingo
production in France was terminated and all (new) Twingo production was concentrated in
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Slovenia to be exported to most destinations (including France).7 Again, the exception was
a small amount of production for the version I in Colombia, mainly for the local market,
but with a few cars shipped to neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela (“export platform MP”).
All Twingo cars sold in France since 2008 were produced in Novo Mesto, Slovenia. Under
the narrow definition, this car switch from 0 to 100% offshored in 2008. Under the broad
definition, the pivotal year involved a change from a small positive number (the local sales
in Latin America) to 100%. The offshoring rate remained 100% under both definitions with
the third generation of Twingo started in 2014, and entirely concentrated in the Slovenian
plant (selling in 29 countries).
Figure 3: Offshoring by income level of source country, narrow (solid) and broad (dashed)
definitions
(a) Narrow def. (b) Broad def.
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Figure 3 depicts trends in offshoring based on the two different definitions of offshoring
and three different offshoring destinations. Panel (a) is based on the narrow definition, while
panel (b) is for the broad definition. The direction of offshoring will be considered “up” for
imports from countries that have per capita incomes that are 20% higher than the home
country. Offshoring “down” corresponds to imports from countries 20% poorer than the
home. “Flat” offshoring refers to similar average income levels. We use market exchange
rates in each case since we are aiming at comparing wages, rather than standards of living.8
7The Flins factory continued to produce the Clio but production at the factory in 2016 was only a quarter
of its 2000 level.
8We considered using data on manufacturing wages in the transport equipment sector but the loss of
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We average incomes from 2000 to 2016 so as to prevent offshoring in a given country from
shifting from being down to flat if, say the income of the country grew substantially during
the period.9 The relative nature of this definition implies that assembly in a well-to-do
country like Belgium can be considered offshoring down if, as in the case of Volvo, the brand
home is more than 20% higher income.
The picture from figure 3 is that in narrow offshoring remains globally a limited phe-
nomenon, since the part of it that concerns low cost locations peaks at 10% of home demand.
However, offshoring “down” is now twice as high (8%) as it was in 2000, contrasting sharply
with the declinging trends for both offshoring “up” and of offshoring “flat.” The broad
offshoring shares are uniformly higher than the corresponding narrow shares, as was to be
expected from the inclusion of all kinds of MP (vertical, horizontal and export platform)
under that approach.
Figure 4 shows that the patterns we see at the global level for offshoring are not replicated
evenly across the main brand homes. The figure applies the same vertical range (0–50%)
to each country’s level of narrow offshoring so as to facilitate comparisons. The top row
shows the two large countries whose increase in offshoring from lower income countries was
most pronounced, France and Italy. The United States and Germany exhibit quite different
patterns. While the low cost locations are also attracting production of US and German
brands, the rate of progress is much more modest. The extraordinary level of “flat” offshoring
of US brands is distinctive and almost entirely attributable to the long history of market
integration with Canada. The UK and Japan, are at the other extreme from France and
Italy, with extremely little narrow offshoring. While this is perhaps not so surprising for
UK brands, consisting mainly of luxury and sports cars, it is quite striking for Japanese
mass-oriented car producers.
The broad definition of offshoring does not change the picture dramatically for France and
Italy (figure 5). Both countries have seen a very impressive rise in the share of production
in poorer countries for cars aimed at serving both the domestic and foreign consumers. The
picture for the USA is more radically changed suggesting that when serving third markets,
US brands tend to use more low-cost production facilities (often local) than when serving the
domestic market. Offshoring of US cars in Canada seems to be mainly intended to serve the
US market. The UK remains an exception with very low levels of broad offshoring. However,
the share of Japan-brand cars produced in poorer countries has risen from 10% to 40%.
Figure 6 shows that even within a brand home like France, the country that shows the
countries due to missing data did not seem like a good trade-off given that we are dividing countries into
coarse categories.
9This prevents sudden jumps in offshoring that are not related to actual changes in production but only
to country classification.
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Figure 4: Offshoring (narrow) in six major brand homes
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Figure 5: Offshoring (broad) in six major brand homes
(a) France (b) Italy
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Figure 6: Brand-level differences in offshoring within France
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most marked trend towards offshoring, there has been remarkable heterogeneity across the
brands in terms of their expansion of narrow offshoring. All three brands have dramatically
increased sourcing from poorer countries. However, Renault’s rise from near 0 to 60% off-
shoring in just 6 years (2003–2009) is the most spectacular boom in narrow offshoring we have
seen. The Novo Mesto, Slovenia and Bursa, Turkey plants were the primary beneficiaries of
this massive reallocation of assembly activity.
Figure 7 shows that the brand heterogeneity exhibited in France is part of a broader
phenomena in which just five top brands account for 50% of the world’s offshoring. This
figure holds for the narrow definition of offshoring in 2016. While these five brands are all
large, their global share of sales in 2016 is just 22%. Concentration of offshoring was even
more impressive in the early 2000s, when the top five offshoring brands represented 76% of
world (narrow) offshoring (and 26% of world production). These figures suggest that brand
heterogeneity must be examined if one is to understand the rise in offshoring. One might
question our insistence on brands at this point. Is it not really just firm heterogeneity? The
case of Fiat is our best reply since both Ferrari and Maserati are owned by Fiat but neither
brand offshores production. Similarly, within our data range, of the Volkswagen-owned
brands (Audi, Bugatti, Porsche, Seat, Skoda, etc.), only VW itself engages in significant
offshoring.
We summarize offshoring trends as follows: Offshored cars from poorer—yet OECD—
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Figure 7: A few firms account for most offshoring from low-wage countries
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countries have small market shares at home, but have doubled from four to eight percent.
Downward offshoring exceeds offshoring from similar-income sources. Broad definition off-
shoring is much larger but it includes horizontal (market-seeking) MP that probably does not
substitute much for home production. The China story in cars is completely different from
iPhones. There is massive heterogeneity in offshoring: Similar countries and firms offshore
in vastly different amounts. The “few” (top 5 brands) account for the majority of offshoring.
4 Comparative advantage and the offshoring decision
What factors drive offshoring? Why are some models offshored and others not? McCalman
and Spearot (2013) study US truck makers offshoring to Mexico. Their results point to
low complexity, older vintages, and small scale as variables associated with higher shares
of trucks sourced from Mexican factories. With only one outsourcing country in their data
set, they obviously could not investigate the role of headquarter country attributes. On the
other hand, since our data contains 23 HQ countries and 50 assembly countries, we are able
to examine the roles of country and country-model interactions in determining comparative
advantage.
To explain why some models are offshored but others are not, we need a theory and
measurement of model-level comparative advantage. For this exercise, we employ a simple
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two-country model of a home country that potentially offshores assembly of a car model to
a lower income foreign country. When necessary to avoid confusion between the two uses of
the term model, we will refer to car models as varieties.
Our model of the offshoring decision takes its inspiration from the seminal papers of
Dornbusch et al. (1980), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), and Schott (2004). We hypothesize
that model m-level comparative advantage of country i is determined by the interaction of
i development level and m skill-intensity.
Let costs of domestic production for a model m be given by a nested Cobb-Douglas that
takes the following form
c(m) = α
(
w
z(m)
H w
1−z(m)
L
)β
p1−βI exp((m)), (1)
where z(m) is the cost share parameter for high-skilled workers, paid wH , while the low
skilled ones are paid wL. Importantly, those cost shares can vary by model. Costs comprise
labor with share β and a basket of intermediate inputs priced pI and used with a constant
share 1 − β. There is also a random term (m) that captures the (mis-)match between the
precise model m and the domestic country in terms of overall productive efficiency. In log
terms,
ln c(m) = lnα + z(m)β lnwH + (1− z(m))β lnwL + (1− β) ln pI + (m). (2)
Car manufacturers can also resort to a different production location than the domestic mar-
ket, i.e. offshore to a country where all variables are superscripted with an asterisk, and ship
back to home the assembled cars, with cost τ . There is also an additional cost for operating
a factory abroad by the manufacturer denoted γ. Both τ and γ take the iceberg form. Costs
in the case of offshoring are given by
ln c∗(m) = lnα∗ + z(m)β lnw∗H + (1− z(m))β lnw∗L + (1− β) ln p∗I + ln(τγ) + ∗(m). (3)
It is convenient to introduce notation ω and κ, such that
ω ≡ ln
(
wH
wL
)
and κ ≡ lnα + β lnwL + (1− β) ln pI ,
ω∗ ≡ ln
(
w∗H
w∗L
)
and κ∗ ≡ lnα∗ + β lnw∗L + (1− β) ln p∗I + ln(τγ).
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The choice to offshore will be driven by cost minimization, such that
Prob(offshoring) = Prob [ln c∗(m) < ln c(m)]
= Prob [κ∗ + z(m)βω∗ + ∗(m) < κ+ z(m)βω + (m)]
= Prob [∗(m)− (m) < κ− κ∗ + z(m)β(ω − ω∗)] . (4)
Assuming that ∗(m)− (m) is distributed logistically (which will be the case if each of those
terms is distributed Gumbel) gives immediately a closed form formula for this probability of
offshoring:
Prob(offshoring) = Λ [κ− κ∗ + βz(m)(ω − ω∗)] , with Λ(x) = (1 + e−x)−1. (5)
There are two variables in equation (5) that affect the propensity to offshore. The first,
κ − κ∗, is the additional cost needed to assemble cars (to be delivered to the domestic
consumer) in the home country of the brand compared to alternative assembly locations.
Our regressions will use the fixed effect of country i as a production site from our gravity
equation (described in next section), together with estimated frictions γ and τ as proxies
for κ − κ∗. The second variable in (5) is an interaction between skill intensity, z(m), and
the relative costs of skilled and unskilled labor compared to the rest of world, ω − ω∗. The
latter factor (captured empirically with the level of development of the HQ country) make
offshoring more likely for models that intensively use skilled labor. Intuitively, a rich country
where the relative wage of skilled labor is low will tend to offshore models with low z. We
refer to low z models assembled in skill-abundant countries as “misfits.” On the contrary,
rich countries will keep at home the models for which they have a comparative advantage,
i.e. the ones that use skilled labor intensively. Empirically, we expect the combined skill and
capital intensity of a model to be well proxied by its relative price. As we describe in the
next section, we must purge the prices of each model of market-level determinants (such as
sales taxes).
5 The proxies for assembly costs and skill intensity
The next two subsections explain how we estimate our proxies for κ − κ∗, the cost disad-
vantage of the home country in assembly, and z(m)(ω − ω∗), the product-level comparative
advantage misfit term.
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5.1 Triadic gravity estimates of assembly costs
First, we need to estimate cost advantage in assembly of each car-producing nation. To do
so, we take an equation from the multinational production model by Arkolakis et al. (2018),
hereafter ARRY, to the data. Their own empirical work lacked the data variation needed
to estimate the two sets of frictions present in this equation. We therefore believe this is
the first empirical estimate of what we will call the “triadic gravity” equation. The triad in
question is
1. The HQ country, denoted i,
2. The final assembly location, denoted `,
3. The country in which the car is sold, denoted n.
Let Xi`n/Xn denote the market share obtained by `-made cars of i-based brands in n.
ARRY’s equation (7) delivers this share as the product of two factors:
Xi`n
Xn
= ψi`nλ
E
in,
where ψi`n is the probability that country ` is the minimum-cost location for a firm from i
serving market n, and λEin is the share of n’s expenditures spent on firms from i. We can leave
λEin unspecified here because it is captured by a fixed effect in the empirical implementation
of the triadic gravity.
The costs associated with delivering a car designed in i and produced in ` to consumers
in n depend on marginal production costs denoted c`, costs τ`n for shipping products from
` to n, and costs γi` for i-based transferring HQ inputs to factories in `. The aggregation
of model-specific unit cost functions such as equation (1) has not yet been solved in the
literature.10 To make headway, we will therefore work with an approximation involving a
representative variety so that we can still obtain aggregate flow shares of the form derived by
Arkolakis et al. (2018) in their Lemma 1. The unit costs in country ` for that representative
model are
c` = α`
(
wzH`w
1−z
L`
)β
p1−βI , (6)
There are also unobserved productivity shocks, distributed multivariate Pareto with param-
10The problem is that heterogeneity in z(m) is analogous to random coefficients in a differentiated products
demand model. Since heterogeneity cannot be isolated into a multiplicative shock, there is no closed form
for the aggregate probability ψi`n.
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eters θ and ρ.11 The probability i-based firms serving n choose ` as supplier is
ψi`n =
[
(c`τ`nγi`)
−θ] 11−ρ∑
k [(ckτknγik)
−θ]
1
1−ρ
. (7)
We can therefore express market shares as a function of two frictions and two sets of fixed
effects:
Xi`n
Xn
= exp
[
FEA` + FESin − θ
1− ρ(ln τ`n + ln γi`)
]
The assembly (A) and sales (S) fixed effects (FE) have structural interpretations with,
FEA` = − θ
1− ρ ln c`
FESin = lnλ
E
in − (1− ρ)−1 ln
[∑
k
(ckτknγik)
−θ
]
We refer to FEA` as the cost advantage in this industry. The next step is to parameterize the
two frictions, τ`n between factory and buyer, γi` between HQ and factory. Let D represent
the vector of five common friction determinants
• Home (×OECD`/LDC`): the reverse of a border effect.
• Distance and Contiguity, standard measures of spatial separation
• RTA, regional trade agreements such as NAFTA, EU, etc.
• Applied tariffs: ln(1 + tariff`n) where tariff`n is the tariff rate relevant when exporting
cars from ` to n and ln(1 + tariffi`) with tariffi` being an average of tariffs paid when
importing car parts in ` from HQ country i. Note that the two last frictions are policy
variables that do vary over time unlike geography frictions.
Denoting the corresponding vector of marginal costs for trade and production as gT and gP ,
trade and multinational production frictions are given by
τ`n = exp(D
′
`ng
T ), γi` = exp(D
′
i`g
P )
The triadic gravity estimating equation is therefore obtained by substituting the frictions
11Tintelnot (2017) and Head and Mayer (2018) obtain an observationally equivalent ψi`n by assuming
Type 1 Extreme Value productivity shocks.
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terms for τ and γ, yielding
Xi`n
Xn
= exp
[
FEA` + FESin − θ
1− ρD
′
`ng
T − θ
1− ρD
′
i`g
P
]
We use quantity shares Qi`n/Qn, with Qn ≡
∑
i
∑
`Qi`n in place of unobserved value market
shares Xi`n/Xn. Acknowledging unobserved/imperfectly measured frictions determinants,
the moment condition we want to estimate is
E
[
Qi`n
Qn
]
= exp
[
FEA` + FESin + D
′
`ng˜
T + D′i`g˜
P
]
(8)
where the g˜ coefficients multiply g by −θ/(1− ρ).
Comparing this to ARRY equation (29), we see that their specification features i` fixed
effects which absorb γi`. Because c` and γi` enter multiplicatively in the numerator of (7), a
structural i` fixed effect is separable into ` terms and γi` if one is willing to parameterize γi`.
However, ARRY only have data on exports for affiliates from one origin, the USA, courtesy
of the BEA. This data limitation implies that γi` is not identified in the presence of ` fixed
effects.
A further advantage of our dataset concerns destination markets n. BEA data used
by ARRY have just five specified destinations: USA, CAN, JPN, GBR, and a 14-country
European Union composite. Our estimation includes 21 HQ countries, 52 producing, and
76 consuming countries.12 Thus we have the requisite HQ-assembly variation to identify γi`
and much more variation for estimating the effects of the five determinants of τ`n. It should
be noted, however that a large fraction (73%) of the final estimating sample has Qi`n = 0.
Taking triadic gravity to the data requires an error term. If we assumed a multiplicative
error term distributed as a homoskedastic log-normal then we could take logs and estimate
the MLE via OLS. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that we should prefer estima-
tors that are consistent under weaker assumptions on the error term, such as the Poisson
pseudo-MLE (PPML).This estimator has the additional advantage of keeping the zeros in
the regression. We estimate this condition using PPML with market shares as the dependent
variable. Our estimator is equivalent to the multinomial pseudo-MLE proposed by Eaton
et al. (2013).13 We have 17 years of data so we estimate the model with `t and int fixed
effects.14
12There are two countries, Brazil and Uruguay, that the estimation drops because their sole brands (Agrale
and Effa, respectively) produce only at home, thus preventing identification of fixed effects for both brand
and location.
13Head and Mayer (2014) show that the estimator performs well under a fairly wide range of error term
structures.
14To deal with the large number of FEs, we use the poi2hdfe estimator provided by Paulo Guimaraes.
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Table 2: Triadic gravity trade and MP frictions estimates. Dependent variable: {HQ i,
made-in-`} market shares in n
trade τ`n MP γi`
home (OECD) 1.454a 2.807a
(.367) (1.019)
home (LDC) 3.364a 3.743a
(.517) (.855)
ln distance -.536a .081
(.11) (.215)
contiguity .339c .063
(.18) (.399)
RTA .79a .589
(.255) (.567)
ln (1+tariff) -9.285a -5.759
(1.024) (6.361)
200,735 observations (21 HQ, 52 assemblers,
76 markets, 17 years). PPML with `t and int
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the
assembly-country (`) level. Significance lev-
els: c: p < 0.1, b: p < 0.05, a: p < 0.01. The
squared correlation between predicted and ac-
tual market shares (our measure of fit) is 0.91.
Table 2 provides results of our triadic gravity regression. The display is organized such
that the first column shows results related to τ`n, while the second shows the ones for γi`, all
variables being included in the same regression that also includes the full set of production(-
time) and HQ-destination(-time) fixed effects. The most impressive coefficients relate to the
home dummies. They point to very large advantages of producing where the markets are
(first column), and for operating an assembly plant in the same country where the brand
is headquartered. For both variables, the revealed effects on market share are very large:
Sales in a OECD market are 4 times larger (exp(1.45) = 4.2) if the car is assembled locally,
and 16 times larger when the production country is also the HQ country. The corresponding
home “premia” for LDCs are 29 and 42. An important point is that these large home effects
are present even though tariffs are controlled for in the regression. Tariffs on assembled cars
have a strong impact on sales. Our elasticity of 9.3 is reasonably close to the estimates
from Arkolakis et al. (2018) (Table 1, 8.4 to 11.6 in estimations that aggregate over multiple
industries), and Head and Mayer (2018) (Table 3, estimate of 7.7 using brand-level sourcing
decisions that condition on each brand’s set of production locations). The combination of
typically very large tariff rates on assembled cars with this high elasticity and large LDC
home coefficients implies that production has to be local for market shares to be lifted out
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of the negligible area in poor countries.
The other τ`n frictions have the usual sign and imply overall that even outside national
borders, proximity is important for market shares in the car industry. Membership of a
regional agreement tends to double market shares (exp(0.79) = 2.2) on average (and this
effect is on top of the stimulus to trade from eliminating tariffs). RTA membership also has
large positive effects on the headquarter-assembly country dimension, but the coefficient is
estimated imprecisely. Distance and contiguity also have noisy estimates in the i` dimension
but their estimated magnitudes are near zero. In sum, triadic gravity equations yield results
similar to conventional gravity estimates in the origin-destination dimension for all the stan-
dard determinants, but the only statistically significant determinant of γi` is production in
the headquarter country (home).
We estimate assembly-country effect, FEA`t separately from the headquarter-country
effects contained in the FESint effects. That is we would like to know whether cars made in
Germany have high market shares abroad because Germany is a good place to make cars
or because German brands are very strong. There is an analogy with worker and firm fixed
effects used in employer-employee data sets as well as the “places versus people” issue in
economic geography.15 Identification is impossible without a certain degree of overlap. In the
case of workers, that means one needs either simultaneous dual-job holders or job-switchers.
In labour markets only the latter source of variation is common. Fortunately, both sources of
overlap are amply available in the car data. The United States as a production country makes
American, German, and Japanese brands along with smaller levels of production of other
brands. Meanwhile, Japanese brands are assembled in 31 different countries. This overlap
implies that the FEAs estimate the cost advantages of assembly countries after purging the
influence of the strong (or weak) brands based in those countries.
Figure 8 reports our results where for each country we average the FEA`t and FESint
obtained from the estimation of equation (8). This results in two bars for each country,
the blue one giving the advantage of the country as an assembly site, and the red one
summarizing the strength of its brands through its position as a headquarters. Italy serves
as the reference country in both cases which is why it is set to zero. Bars are sorted from
the country implied to have the lowest costs (South Korea) to the one with the highest costs
(Egypt).
Korea, Germany, Japan and the United States all rank highly as both as assembly sites
and as headquarters of high performance brands. The UK is revealed to be a better pro-
duction place than the US, but the brands originating there are estimated to be weak. This
may seem surprising if one thinks of Jaguar, Aston Martin, etc. compared to Chevrolet,
15See Abowd et al. (1999) on the former and Gibbons et al. (2014) on the latter.
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Figure 8: The best assembly and HQ countries for cars
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Plymouth, etc. However, the regression identifies a strong brand based on its sales volume
performance when produced in multiple countries. The UK brands generally obtain low mar-
ket shares when assembled abroad. The luxury brands from the UK are further penalized
by the fact the dependent variable is measured in quantity, rather than value, shares.
Emerging economies such as Malaysia or Russia perform negatively on both metrics.
Romania is an interesting case since the regression reveals it to be a quite bad location
for assembling cars. In 2016, there were two assembly plants in Romania. One assembled
Dacias and re-badged some of them as Renaults (the owner of Dacia). A second plant made
Fords. Therefore our regression identifies the FEA for Romania based on the relatively bad
performance of Fords and Renaults assembled in Romania compared to other production
locations for those brands.
5.2 Model-level measure of skill intensity
To measure the model-specific skill intensity, we rely on information about relative prices.
The idea is that high skill intensity requires greater use of workers who command higher
wages (engineers, etc.). Our theory implies that with constant markups over marginal costs,
E ln p(m) = βωz(m) + constant. Thus skill intensity rises linearly with log price. This
suggests that we want to obtain a market and time-invariant component of prices since we
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do not think skill-intensity varies in those dimensions. We therefore need to purge prices,
ln pm, of the destination and time shocks. This is especially important because there are
large destination n-level price effects. For example, a given model is generally much more
expensive in Denmark than in other countries. We have 81,727 observations of ln pmnt for
a set of 1777 models and 28 destinations markets. Therefore we run a two-dimension fixed
effects regression:
ln pmnt = FEMm + FENnt + mnt (9)
With 14 years and 28 countries, there would in principle be 392 destination-years with a full
data set. However, the price data is much more sparse. The maximum is 268 with a mean
of 46, and a median of nine. The minimum is two.
We define ln pm ≡ F̂EMm−mean(F̂EMm) as the deviation of the model fixed effect from
the mean across all models. This normalization is useful because it allows us to interpret
the base effects in regression specifications with interactions.
The fixed effects used to estimate ln pm are available for 1145 brand-model combinations.
For the 1073 remaining distinct brand-models that do not have fixed effects, we use the
average within the brand for the segment (14 function-size-price segments identified using
Polk). For brands that are not represented in a given segment we use the average for all the
models in that segment.
6 Estimates of offshoring probability equation
We use log per capita income, ln yit, as the proxy for the relative abundance of skill and
capital in accordance with the model. The coefficient of chief interest in these regressions
is the interaction of skill abundance with skill intensity, that is: ln yit × ln pm. Our theory
predicts a negative effect for this interaction term so long as the proxies are valid. These
proxies receive support from the Schott (2004) finding that high income countries have
comparative advantage in high-price varieties within each goods classification.
Combining the proxies for general assembly cost advantage with the interaction term
representing model-specific comparative advantage, equation (4) becomes
offsm(i)t = Λ(β1F̂EAit + β2 ln(τˆitγˆit) + β3 ln yit + β4 ln pm + β5(ln pm × ln yit) + · · · ), (10)
where the “· · · ” represent additional offshoring determinants that we adopt from the liter-
ature. Since the FEA and interaction terms are both increasing in the home’s advantages,
the effects of offshoring probabilities are negative, i.e. we expect β1 < 0 and β5 < 0.
The dependent variable in the narrow-definition offshoring regression specification is the
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fraction of i-brand, model m sales in i assembled in a country with 20% lower per capita
income than i. Broad offshoring down is the fraction of i-brand, model m world-wide sales
assembled in countries with 20% lower per capita income.16
6.1 Linear probability model (LPM) results
The first three terms in equation (10) are country-time specific. This implies that we can use
of fixed effects for the headquarter country to capture them. The attraction of this approach
is that we no longer need to rely on the estimated proxies from the triadic gravity equation.
In this case, it is still possible to estimate the effects of ln pm, our proxy for the skill intensity
of the model, and its interaction with income per capita, our measure of skill abundance.
The drawback with this specification is that many of those fixed effects are perfect predictors
of whether or not to offshore. Since the coefficients in linear regressions on binary dependent
variables are usually very close to the average marginal effects obtained by logit or probit
regressions, we run a first set of linear probability model (LPM) regressions.17
Table 3: Offshoring regressions—Linear regressions
sample: all HQ countries only OECD HQ
market: home all home all
ln model price -0.062a -0.217a 0.020 -0.248a
(0.020) (0.025) (0.060) (0.075)
ln model price × ln yit -0.055a -0.124a -0.133a -0.142b
(0.012) (0.016) (0.042) (0.064)
ln brand sales 0.012b 0.022a 0.018a 0.028a
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
ln model sales 0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
age of model -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006c
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
years left to model 0.005b 0.009a 0.007b 0.012a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 12393 18701 9045 14871
R2 0.263 0.320 0.253 0.287
count of models 1760 2439 1142 1745
Note: Brand-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
c: p < 0.1, b: p < 0.05, a: p < 0.01. Additional controls not reported here:
headquarter-year and segment fixed effects.
16Note that both the numerator and the denominator of broad offshoring are defined more expansively.
17This also facilitates comparison with McCalman and Spearot (2013), who estimate a linear specification
along these lines.
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The first two columns of Table 3 keep offshoring decisions independently of where the
model is headquartered, whereas the last two columns limit the sample to OECD countries.
In each of those samples, we further distinguish between narrow and broad offshoring. A first
result is that high-priced models are less likely to be offshored, especially when the broad
definition is applied, in which case a doubling of the price results in a drop of the probability
of offshoring to a lower-wage country by about 15 percentage points (−0.217×ln(2) = −0.15).
This is the effect for an average income country (ln yi = 0). Our main variable of interest is
the interaction between the price of the model and income per capita. For a country with
twice the average income in our sample, the impact of doubling a variety’s price expand
to a 21 percentage point reduction. This supports our hypothesis that rich countries have
a comparative advantage in skill-intensive models, which results in a lower propensity to
source those from abroad as income rises.
6.2 Fractional logit results
Table 4: Offshoring fractions: narrow vs broad
Fraction of Home sales World sales
model-years offshored Count Percent Count Percent
all 1627 8.7 5866 31.37
majority 99 .53 887 4.74
minority 170 .91 1864 9.97
none 10497 56.13 10084 53.92
n/a∗ 6308 33.73
∗ n/a occurs under the narrow definition of offshoring because of
model-years not sold in the home market of the model’s brand.
The linear offshoring specification does not take into account that offshoring fractions
cannot exceed one or fall below zero. Table 4 shows that in the vast majority of cases the
offshoring fraction is zero or one, i.e. at the boundaries of the permissible range, which
suggests we should estimate a binary choice model such as logit (or probit). The logit also
allows the marginal effects to depend on the probability of offshoring. Since Table 4 shows
that 1.44% (narrow definition) and 15% (broad definition) of offshoring fractions lie between
0 and 1, we use fractional logit as our estimation method rather than standard logit, which
expects a truly binary dependent variable.
Under this specification, offshoring of model m in year t is a function of two variables
obtained from the triadic gravity equation , which replaces the headquarter-year fixed ef-
fects: F̂EAit and ln(τˆitγˆit), with τˆit and γˆit being calculated as the average of the predicted
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bilateral frictions using coefficients from Table 2. As in the linear specification, ln pm, and
its interaction with ln yit are estimated, and the omission of headquarter-time effects also
allows identification of ln yit. Additional explanatory variables are included to capture scale
effects (worldwide sales of model and brand) and vintage effects (age of model and years left
in program). We also include function-size-price segment dummies and year dummies.
Table 5 provides our estimates of the fractional logit regressions. Columns (1) to (3)
consider all models, whereas the last two columns eliminate models associated with 110
non-OECD (mainly Chinese) brands. The first specification is a linear model, which we use
as a starting point because it can be compared to the first column of Table 3. We then
move to our preferred fractional logit results in column (2). In both the linear and the logit
specifications, the assembly cost advantage of the headquarter country strongly reduces the
likelihood of offshoring.
The interaction between price and income is negative as expected in both the linear and
logit regressions. The linear coefficient, −0.029 is somewhat smaller (in absolute value) than
it was in the specification with country-year fixed effects (−0.055). The interpretation of
interaction terms is complicated by the non-linearity of the logit model.18 The best way to
understand these effects is through graphical display. The marginal effects (evaluated from
the 1st to 99th percentiles) of model price and income are displayed in Figure 9. In panel (a)
we see that for low income countries the marginal effect of a higher price is near zero. This
is telling us that poor countries are unlikely to offshore any models, regardless of their price.
This fact is illustrated in Figure 10 where we see the model predicts and the data depicts
the absence of offshoring by poor countries.
The marginal effect of a higher price remains near zero until relatively high levels of GDP
per capita are achieved. For countries with incomes over that of Spain in 2016, the marginal
effect becomes significantly negative. For the highest income HQ countries (USA, Sweden,
and Australia in 2016), increasing the price by 10% decreases the likelihood of offshoring
by 1.5 percentage points. This should be seen as a substantial effect given that the average
probability of offshoring is just seven percent. The histogram of per capita incomes shown
below the marginal effects in Panel (a) reveals that most of the models in our sample are
produced in countries whose incomes are high enough to yield significantly negative marginal
effects of price.
Panel (b) of Figure 9 displays the marginal effects of higher income conditional on model
price. There are large positive effects for inexpensive cars and zero effects for very expensive
cars. The switchover point from positive to negative effect occurs at the price level of a
BMW X1 or Subaru Outback (ln pm ≈ 0.5). As the histogram below panel (b) indicates,
18See Ai and Norton (2003) for a fulsome discussion.
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Table 5: Offshoring regressions (fractional logit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
method: OLS Fractional logit
sample: all HQ countries only OECD HQ
market: home (narrow) all home all
HQ comp. adv. (F̂EAit) -0.036
b -0.610a -0.210 -0.603a -0.340b
(0.014) (0.213) (0.138) (0.216) (0.151)
frictions (ln τˆitγˆit) -0.018 -2.330
c -0.347 -2.425c -0.293
(0.025) (1.209) (0.220) (1.299) (0.425)
ln yit 0.056
b 3.644a 1.223a 3.289a 0.363
(0.024) (1.209) (0.210) (1.155) (0.294)
ln model price -0.012 0.649 -1.347a -0.052 -1.983a
(0.018) (1.035) (0.268) (1.685) (0.518)
ln model price × ln yit -0.029b -1.802b -0.865a -1.281 -0.507
(0.014) (0.807) (0.262) (1.203) (0.520)
ln brand sales 0.007 0.135 0.250a 0.123 0.242b
(0.007) (0.134) (0.091) (0.134) (0.095)
ln model sales 0.006b 0.068 -0.035 0.072 -0.031
(0.003) (0.057) (0.029) (0.058) (0.031)
age of model 0.001 -0.002 -0.035c -0.003 -0.035
(0.001) (0.039) (0.021) (0.041) (0.023)
years left to model 0.006b 0.092a 0.051b 0.090a 0.062b
(0.003) (0.033) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026)
Observations 11796 11796 18076 9039 14864
R2 0.106 0.243 0.310 0.228 0.288
count of models 1726 1726 2405 1142 1745
Note: Brand-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls not re-
ported here: year, segment. Significance levels: c: p < 0.1, b: p < 0.05, a: p < 0.01.
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Figure 9: Marginal effects of interacting comp. adv. factors
(a) Model price (b) GDP per capita
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higher income countries are more likely to engage in offshoring for the vast majority of the
models in our sample.
Figure 10: Offshoring is for the rich
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Predicted Data
Figure 10 shows that the estimated model can predict national rates of offshoring rea-
sonably well. Offshoring in the data by the historical brand headquarters (France, Italy,
UK, Germany, Japan, and USA) are all fairly close to their predicted levels. There are two
prominent deviations from the predicted offshoring rate that turn out to be based on single
brands. Seat (a subsidiary of Volkswagen) is the only Spanish brand. Our regressions predict
it should offshore very little and indeed the models from which it derives most sales (Ibiza
and Leon) are assembled in Spain. However, Seat offshores four models that it sells in tiny
amounts. Australia is an even more glaring case of the regression under-predicting the rate
of offshoring. Again there is only a single domestic brand which is owned by a large foreign
firm. In this case, General Motors was phasing out the manufacturing activity of Holden
over the estimation period. On 20 October 2017, Holden closed its last Australian plant,
although the brand continues as an importer of vehicles (that is, offshoring rises to 100% in
2018).
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6.3 Other determinants of offshoring
Our discussion of results in the two previous subsections focuses on the two chief hypothe-
ses about offshoring, general cost advantages in assembly and model-specific comparative
advantage. We now discuss the controls that we added to the specification.
Our regressions incorporate dummies for the market “segment” of each model. We clas-
sified all models into 14 segments based on three categorical variables provided by IHS:
• Function/usage (SUV, MPV, sport car, etc.) referred to in the data set as “Global
Sales Sub-segment”
• Size categories (A–F), measured in length, but relative to the corresponding functional
category. In the data this is called the “Global Sales Segment.”
• Price class: entry/mid-level (1), premium (2), luxury (3). The first two are defined
relative to size and function categories; luxury is a stand-alone segment. This variable
is called the “Global Sales Price Class.”
Table 6: Size of 14 categories (2000–16 totals)
Category Value ($bn) Volume (mn) Price($th) Brands(#)
midloCar 7794.68 331.47 23.52 94
bigSUV 5873.86 93.28 62.97 96
smallCar 3610.34 226.78 15.92 97
smallSUV 3309.28 98.36 33.64 99
midhiCar 1592.46 46.3 34.39 23
bigMPV 1537.79 40.44 38.03 53
smallMPV 1512.37 65.77 22.99 55
bigmedCar 1379.55 26.61 51.83 26
bighiCar 405.74 3.53 115.03 11
bigloCar 327.84 10.32 31.77 34
midSport 256.18 7.16 35.77 25
bigSport 234.97 2.68 87.56 24
smallSport 83.04 3.18 26.09 23
lux 74.53 .33 228.98 16
We provide some basic information on the 14 segments in Table 6. The table sorts the
segments by an estimate of worldwide sales values in that segment. The quantities come
from our main data set but the average prices for each segment are estimated based on much
more limited data. We see that segments are very different in size. Thus a firm can achieve
high market share in the “lux” (luxury) category with much lower volume of sales than in
the “midloCar” segment.
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Figure 11: Segment-level effects of offshoring rates
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The segment-level fixed effects are displayed in Figure 11, where mid-sized, low price cars
(midlocar) are taken as the benchmark.19 The dominant feature of this figure is that smaller
cars are more offshoreable. This effect is above and beyond the fact that smaller cars are
cheaper since we have controlled separately for price at the model level. This could be due to
lower shipping costs for smaller cars and lower import tariffs (which are generally positively
associated with larger engine sizes). Smaller cars may also be less skill-intensive.
We included controls for scale and vintage effects, in part to be able to compare results
to those of McCalman and Spearot (2013). They find negative variety-level scale effects on
offshoring to Mexico. In particular, trucks produced at above-median scale are less likely to
be offshored. We cannot think of any microeconomic underpinnings for dichotomizing scale
and therefore measure it as log world-wide sales (in units) of the model. Model-level scale
has small and statistically insignificant effects. On the other hand, we find brand-level scale
is a positive predictor of broad offshoring, a result that is consistent with the mechanism of
Helpman et al. (2004).
A second variable for which we can compare results is the “vintage” of a model. Mc-
Calman and Spearot (2013) find that varieties are less likely to be offshored in their first
year of production. The story attached to this result is older varieties are more standardized
and therefore easier to produce far from headquarters. However, recent work by Hanson
19As can be seen in Table 6, midlocar is the by far largest segment by volume.
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(2015) finds a negative relationship between offshoring and routinization that pushes in the
opposite direction. He argues that tasks that are routine tend to be easier to automate.
When automation is an option, it appears to dominate offshoring. We find that model age
has an effect that is small and mainly not statistically different from zero. In the two specifi-
cations where variety age is marginally significant, it has a negative effect, more in line with
Hanson’s result.
Car model designs are referred to in our data as “programs.” Since they have different
durations we can separate the age of a model from the number of years left in the program.
While age has essentially no effect, there are systematically positive and significant effects
of “years left” on the offshoring decision. The natural interpretation for such effects is that
it is easier to recover the fixed costs of offshoring for models with longer lifespans.
Our price results are quite different from McCalman and Spearot (2013). They find that
only price residuals matter and they enter negatively. Our data lacks the features of models
that might be used to estimate price residuals. However, we find that prices themselves have
negative impacts on offshoring, provided the per-capita income of the home country is high
enough.
An important finding of McCalman and Spearot (2013) is that complexity reduces off-
shoring. They measure complexity using variation in a large vector of features. Our data
contains no direct analogue for this measure. However, we conjecture that if we did have
variation in features, it would be higher for higher priced and larger cars. Hence our results
that higher price varieties and larger cars are less likely to be offshored could arise in part
from their greater complexity.
McCalman and Spearot (2013) have data on US and Mexico only so they cannot estimate
the role of country-specific “assembly advantage” as we do here. Also they cannot estimate
the interaction between country development and model prices. Furthermore, as their data
set has sales in Canada and US only, they cannot calculate our “broad” measure of offshoring.
To sum up, we find that controls for variety age and scale have very little effect on the
decision to offshore. The variables that do seem to promote offshoring are small size, brand
scale, and years left for the model’s design. Taken as a whole, however, the controls do not
affect in a material way the key results of our paper, namely that richer countries tend to
offshore low-end cars. To establish this, we reproduced Figure 9 without any of the additional
controls and found them to deliver the same message in terms of the signs and magnitudes
of the marginal effects.
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7 Conclusion
Offshoring assembly to lower wage countries is growing in the car industry. Under the broad
definition comprising all car assembly in lower income countries, offshoring has risen from
20% (in 2000) to 40% of global production. However, because of tariff and large estimated
non-tariff barriers, we find this form of offshoring is mostly motivated by the need to produce
locally to serve LDC markets. Under our narrow definition that considers only cars assembled
in low wage countries to be sold at home, the amount of offshoring is quite limited, accounting
for just eight percent of the home country’s market. Furthermore, the lower wage countries
in question generally do not include the countries best known as offshoring sites for other
industries. Car makers assemble in China mainly for the Chinese market. When making
cars for the home or third-country markets, the preferred assembly locations appear to be
Mexico (for serving the North American market) and the Eastern European countries that
entered the European Union in 2004. The other sense that offshoring is limited is that it is
highly concentrated among a few firms. The top five brands in any given year account for
about half of narrow offshoring.
Our triadic gravity regressions estimate a substantial double penalty of offshoring : γ
frictions give a cost disadvantage to factories outside the home country and τ frictions add
further costs on the cars when they are imported back into the home market. The only
force militating in favour of offshoring by the narrow definition is comparative disadvantage
at home. We therefore hypothesize that comparative advantage should play a major role in
determining why some models are offshored and others not. We find that estimates of HQ
country cost advantage in car assembly are strong negative predictors of narrow offshoring
but have weaker effect on broad offshoring. This makes sense given that broad offshoring
undoubtedly includes much production abroad that is oriented towards market access in the
host country.
Looking within countries we find that low-price models from high-income countries are
the most likely to be offshored. A traditional Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of this result
is that price is acting as proxy for skill intensity and per capita income is a proxy for
relative skill abundance. Alternatively, it could be that high price is measure of quality,
which high income countries have a comparative advantage in supplying. Prices also capture
markups, of course. There is a widespread intuition that low markups and competition
“force” low-margin varieties to be offshored. However, a cost minimizing firm should still
want to produce its high-markup models in the low-cost location. Hence we prefer the
interpretation that cross-product variation in offshoring is mainly driven by misfit between
variety-level factor intensity and factor abundance in the headquarter country. This view
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conforms with the conclusion that Hanson (2015) draws from comparing offshore assembly
rates across sectors: “a narrative with strong Heckscher-Ohlin plot lines seems to tell much
of the story of changes in global production sharing. It may require much richer industry
data to find other determinants at work.” The striking result of our paper is that when
using the very rich data on global car assembly, we again find a pattern of offshoring that
can be well-explained by invoking Heckscher-Ohlin forces.
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